Game Harmony: A Short Note

Strategic uncertainty in game theory may have two different general sources, either alone or in combination: uncertainty because of the existence of a coordination problem, and uncertainty because of a conflict between one own and the other n players' interests. Game harmony is conceived as a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of the n players are, as embodied in the game payoffs. Pure coordination games are examples of games with maximal game harmony; zero sum games are examples of games with very low game harmony. This note briefly describes attempts to measure game harmony simply as a real-valued number

Envy and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia

The underlying motivations for envy or related social preferences and their impact on agricultural innovations are examined by combining data from money burning experimental game and household survey from Ethiopia. In the first stage of the money burning experimental game, income inequality is induced by providing different endowments and playing a lottery. In the second, people are allowed to decrease (‘burn’) other players’ money at their own expense. Conditional on individual behaviour, experimentally measured envious preferences from others have a negative effect on real life agricultural innovation.envy, social preferences, money burning games, agricultural innovations, Ethiopia

Inferential Expectations

We propose that the formation of beliefs be treated as statistical hypothesis tests, and we label such beliefs inferential expectations. If a belief is overturned through the build-up of evidence, agents are assumed to switch to the rational expectation. Rational expectations are shown to be a special (limiting) case of inferential expectations, with the test size a becoming a metric for rationality. When inferential expectations are built into a Dornbusch-style model of the exchange rate, regression tests of Uncovered Interest Parity and the rational expectations version of the term structure both display downward bias in the slope coefficient. We present the results of an experiment that supports inferential expectations.expectations; macroeconomics; rationality; uncovered interest parity; term structure; exchange rate

Preliminary Experimental Results on the Similarity Function in 2x2 and 3x3 Games

This paper employs two experimental datasets to assess along what dimensions agents evaluate whether two 2x2 or 3x3 games are similar. The Euclidean distance between the payoffs, the absolute difference in game harmony and the difference in mean and standard deviation between the games are all significant components of the estimated similarity function, and so is whether the two games have zero, unique or multiple pure Nash equilibria. However, our explanatory power is limited: substantial extra information can be gathered by collecting similarity evaluation data rather than relying just on our observable proxies

Game Harmony as a Predictor of Cooperation in 2 x 2 Games

This paper presents an experimental test of the relationship between game harmony and cooperation in 2 x 2 games. Game harmony measures describe how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs: coordination games and constant-sum games are examples of games of perfect harmony and disharmony, respectively; most games are somewhere in the middle. Correlation coefficients between measured harmony and cooperation rates were above 0.8 in an experiment with games such as the Prisoner`s Dilemma, the Stag-Hunt, a coordination game and three trust games, and above 0.55 in an experiment with random games.Game harmony, Cooperation, 2 x 2 games, Trust games, Social dilemmas

Learning to play 3x3 games: neural networks as bounded-rational players

"We present a neural network methodology for learning game-playing rules in general. Existing research suggests learning to find a Nash equilibrium in a new game is too difficult a task for a neural network, but says little about what it will do instead. We observe that a neural network trained to find Nash equilibria in a known subset of games will use self-taught rules developed endogenously when facing new games. These rules are close to payoff dominance and its best response. Our findings are consistent with existing experimental results, both in terms of subject's methodology and success rates." [author's abstract

Competence versus Honesty: What Do Voters Care About?

We set up an experiment to measure voter preferences trade-offs between competence and honesty. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the fi rst stage's competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs

A simple stress test of experimenter demand effects

As a stress test of experimenter demand effects, we run an experiment where subjects can physically destroy coupons awarded to them. About one subject out of three does. Giving money back to the experimenter is possible in a separate task but is more consistent with an experimenter demand effect than an explanation based on altruism towards the experimenter. A measure of sensitivity to social pressure helps predict destruction when social information is provided

Which is the More Predictable Gender? Public Good Contribution and Personality

Personality questionnaires have been used and can be used to predict behavior in economic settings. Using two sets of state-of-the-art measures from personality psychology (the Big Six) and social psychology (Social Value Orientation), we find that the behavior of men is predictable in the first half of a public good contribution experiment, whereas that of women is not. This result agrees with the reinterpretation of Carol Gilligan's (1982) view that women are more sensitive to the context in which decisions are made. --gender,context,personality,public goods

Are people willing to pay to reduce others' incomes?

This paper studies utility interdependence in the laboratory. We design an experiment where subjects can reduce ("burn") other subjects' money. Those who burn the money of others have to give up some of their own cash. Despite this cost, and contrary to the assumptions of economics textbooks, the majority of our subjects choose to destroy at least part of others' money holdings. We vary experimentally the amount that subjects have to pay to reduce other people's cash. The implied price elasticity of burning is calculated; it is mostly less than unity. There is a strong correlation between wealth, or rank, and the amounts by which subjects are burnt. In making their decisions, many burners, especially disadvantaged ones, seem to care about whether another person ‘deserves’ the money he has. Desert is not simply a matter of relative payoff